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Abstract 
 
The central premise of concept empiricism is the denial of unique cognitive mental representations. The 
negative thesis applies as well to classic empiricists as it does to current ones. John Locke’s (1690) 
refusal to accept ‘abstract ideas’ is one way of denying unique and distinct cognitive representations. 
Jesse J. Prinz’s (2002) multi-modality hypothesis, according to which cognition functions on a multi-
sensory code instead of a central ‘amodal’ one, is another. Both empiricist models have a common foil in 
a theory that posits one unique kind of ‘intellectualist’ mental representation to account for human 
cognitive achievements. For Locke, it was Descartes’ abstract mental medium for clear and distinct ideas 
and for Prinz it is Jerry Fodor’s Language of Thought. In this paper, I explore the empiricists’ denial of 
unique cognitive representations and argue that both Locke’s and Prinz’s theories privilege a unique 
representational medium – a spatial ‘code.’ As such, this tacit assumption does not entail that cognition 
runs on a unique medium. It does not lead to a ‘common code rationalism,’ to use Prinz’s terms, or 
support computational theories of the mind that privilege innate linguistic structures over sensory ones. 
To incorporate the idea of a spatial code more smoothly within empiricist intellectual resources, I 
interpret it through Lakoff’s experientialist account of categorical cognition. Through Lakoff’s embodied 
experientialist account – embodied neo-empiricism – the spatiality of cognition becomes founded in a 
broader and more plausible sensory matrix. I further suggest that Lakoff’s ideas on and use of spatial 
codes can be given a largely externalist reading. Lakoff’s space is not a unique cognitive one. This way, 
current neo-empiricism can be saved from assuming any unique internal posits including a language of 
thought. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The central premise of concept empiricism is the denial of unique cognitive mental 
representations.1 The negative thesis applies as well to classic empiricists as it does to 
current ones. Locke’s (1690) refusal to accept ‘abstract ideas’ is one way of denying 
unique and distinct cognitive representations. Prinz’s (2002) multi-modality hypothesis, 
according to which cognition functions on a multi-sensory code instead of a central 
‘amodal’ one, is another. Both empiricist models have a common foil in a theory that 
posits one unique kind of ‘intellectualist’ mental representation to account for human 
cognitive achievements. For Locke, it was Descartes’ abstract mental medium for clear 
and distinct ideas and for Prinz it is Jerry Fodor’s Language of Thought. 
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In this paper, I will explore the empiricists’ denial of unique cognitive representations 
and argue that both Locke’s and Prinz’s theories privilege a unique representational 
medium – a spatial ‘code.’ As such, this tacit assumption does not entail that cognition 
runs on a unique medium. It does not lead to a ‘common code rationalism,’ to use 
Prinz’s terms, or support computational theories of the mind that privilege innate 
linguistic structures over sensory ones. Yet the assumption of a privileged code does 
strain empiricist learning-theory which is always externalist in orientation: cognition 
must be based in the senses and, often, senses significantly based in the world. To 
incorporate the idea of a spatial code more smoothly within empiricist intellectual 
resources, I will interpret it through Lakoff’s experientialist account of categorical 
cognition. Through Lakoff’s embodied experientialist account – embodied neo-
empiricism – the spatiality of cognition becomes founded in a broader and more 
plausible sensory matrix. I will further suggest that Lakoff’s ideas on and use of spatial 
codes can be given a largely externalist reading. Lakoff’s space is not a unique 
cognitive one. This way, current neo-empiricism can be saved from assuming any 
unique internal posits including a language of thought.  
 
The order of discussion is the following. In the first section, I will develop the current 
foil for concept empiricists by sketching the role of a central code of cognition, LOT, in 
a standard computational theory of mind. I will motivate the rival concept empiricist 
account by some of the philosophically problematic “realistic” ideas on categorization 
and similarity associated with LOT including the general mind-world isomorphism. I 
will then turn to concept empiricists and start with Locke’s version that cleans the slate 
of all natural kinds and abstract cognitive media including their isomorphic fit with and 
replaces it with a nominalistic metaphysics and mechanical cognitive processes 
intended to create concepts and similarity (complex ideas) from sensory information 
couched and remaining in diverse sensory media. I will argue that a uniform spatial 
framework must exist in the mind for Lockean mental operations to be possible. This 
spatial code allows for ‘translating’ different kinds of complex information, comparing, 
compounding, and abstracting. I will then turn to the neo-Lockean Prinz and show how 
his imagistic “proxytype” model for concepts is based on a similar spatial code to that 
of Locke. I will relate Prinz’s cognitive mechanisms for proxytype concepts, “link 
types” including the hierarchy and transformation link, to Locke’s psychology of 
similarity and argue that such links fail to create similarities if the information linked is 
couched in different sensory media as Prinz maintains. The role of one spatial code 
among arch-empiricist models of the mind poses a problem for their theories that may 
even lead to a bifurcation of the distinction between amodal cognitivists with LOT-like 
posits and genuine empiricism. In the next section, I solve this problem by using the 
central concepts of Lakoff’s embodied experientialist account of categorization to 
sketch a version of concept empiricism that respects the nominalist and multimodal 
premises of concept empiricism and is able to dissipate any amodalist worries that may 
be associated with privileging spatially coded representations in our cognitive lives.  
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Codes and Computation 
 
Computational theories of the mind are in opposition to concept empiricism in terms of 
the codes of cognition. Computational theories posit an amodal, central code. Mental 
representations are coded symbols and are manipulated according to a combinatorial 
syntax and semantics.2 The symbols of the code are non-perceptual in nature even if 
connected to perceptual states or representations.3 The fundamental difference between 
coding amodalists and multi-modalists concerns the codes of cognition – the symbolic 
sensory codes themselves or the amodal symbolic code into which the sensory codes 
are translated into.4  The debate is about the kinds of representations used in cognition. 
 
Jerry Fodor is the most famous amodalist. According to him, cognition takes place in a 
language of thought – ‘Mentalese’ or ‘LOT’ (Fodor, 1975).  Sensory representations 
are translated into LOT and cognition is characterized by operations on mental 
symbols. There is no similarity between LOT and perceptual representations. For 
example, the word ‘tiger’ is equally dissimilar to actual tigers as the mental LOT 
symbol [tiger]. For Fodor, there is a deep similarity between language and Mentalese. 
 
The primitives of LOT are concepts which are assumed to refer to the objects, kinds, or 
categories in the world insofar as those objects, kinds, or categories cause token 
instances of those concepts. Under such causal conditions, the mental symbol is present 
in cognitive processing.5 The sentence-like posits in turn are true or false based on 
isomorphism between mental symbols and their referents. This isomorphism idea fits 
popular ideas of natural and formal languages. An isomorphism between natural/formal 
languages and their referent allows for an explanation of the productivity and 
systematicity of thought and language. For Fodor, this is the explanatory strength of 
LOT.6 
 
According to amodal theories, similarity itself is based on a deep, universal 
psychological grammar including its syntactical mechanisms characterized by 
translation rules. Human categorization is a function of this grammar and is isomorphic 
with reality and its pre-conceptual categorization. In short, mental symbols refer to 
kinds in reality.  More specifically, correct combinations form isomorphic relationships 
between the mind and the structure of the world. The internal grammar is a guide for 
correct isomorphic combinations. Because the grammar’s combination rules ‘carve 
nature at its joints,’ LOT’s similarity base is in the world. The resultant system with 
concepts as primitives and a combinatorial syntax ‘mirrors’ the world’s pre-conceptual 
order and is isomorphically represented in natural language. This isomorphic ‘tripartite 
model’ between the mind, the world, and language, is the broader paradigm of the 
amodal hypothesis about cognition. That is why the debate regarding the code(s) of 
cognition matters. 
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Criticisms of the computational theory of the mind derive from a number of disciplines. 
Empirical findings of psychology suggest that categorization is not amodal.7  
Linguistics suggests that categorization cannot be described by the set-theoretical 
models assumed by the isomorphism. Typicality effects in categorization and basic-
level categories go against it.8 In Philosophy proper, nominalists from Locke (1690) to 
Goodman (1967, 1972, 1978, 1979) have argued against the assumptions of natural 
kind realism and the tripartite mind-world-language relationship it supports. Together, 
these critiques motivate an account of cognition based on perceptual representations 
and its associated multi-modality hypothesis. 
 
 
Locke’s Empiricism about the Mind 
 
In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke articulates a theory of a multi-
modal mind, motivated by a nominalist metaphysics. The Lockean mind is largely 
passive. This is summed up by his famous dictum that the mind is an originally empty 
tabula rasa – except for the mechanisms needed to store and combine perceptual 
representations. According to Locke, foundational information consists of a small set of 
perceptual primitives, simple ideas, given by the world. The overall structure of reality 
is described by his nominalism: ‘all thing that exist [are] particulars’ (Essay III.iii.1).9 
Locke’s particularism regarding the structure of reality is mirrored in his view of the 
mind – he is against abstract ideas and an abstract cognitive medium.10 Locke’s mind 
does not come with innate combining principles or rules by which we group disparate 
perceptual representations. Groupings are created via cognitive mechanisms (and 
experience’s causal conditions). 
 
Locke posits four basic cognitive mechanisms: discernment, comparing, compounding, 
and abstraction. Each mechanism has simple or complex ideas as its primitives.11 
Discernment is the breaking down of complex ideas into simple ideas and 
‘distinguishing between the several ideas’ that constitute those complexes (Essay 
II.xi.1). It provides for the recognition of the fundamental building blocks of the 
mind.12 Compounding produces complex ideas. For example, [red] and [sphere] are 
compounded to create the complex idea [red sphere]. Comparing is the placing together 
of simple ideas without conjoining them. Abstraction produces general ideas. It consists 
of a sort of ‘selective attention’ to certain simple or complex ideas while ignoring 
others.13 The abstracted simple or complex idea is taken to signify all other simple or 
complex ideas which resemble it in a significant way.14 Both simple and complex ideas 
are mental particulars for Locke. They are made general insofar as they are designated 
to stand in a one-many relation to other mental particulars.15   
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The source of similarity and the basis for generality and categorization for Locke lies at 
the level of cognitive mechanisms. Discernment and abstraction play the most 
important role. But Locke’s theory is weak in its ability to provide an explanation of the 
creation of individual mental particulars which have the potential for combination. This 
is due to the use of disparate codes or ‘media’ in cognizing a mental particular. An 
amodal code could ground those disparate representations under a single symbol 
(according to some specific formation rules). It is in this way that general 
ideas/concepts could individuated. If concepts are not adequately individuated, it is 
unclear which representations make up distinct concepts.  If distinctions cannot be 
made, then particulars cannot be created. Nothing in Locke’s theory explains how 
representations from different modalities can be instantiated in the same mental 
particular. Without an amodal code, the visual, haptic, olfactory, and gustatory 
representations, to name a few, cannot be compared or compounded. Ideas that reside 
in different media cannot be used to form mental particulars.16 
 
I believe that Locke actually avoids this ‘information catastrophe’ by thinking about all 
of the specific representations as occurring in a kind of mental space. He salvages a 
representationally weak or chaotic mind by adopting an amodal spatial code. Let us see 
how. 
 
This is seen from Locke’s master-metaphor. For him, mental operations are analogous 
to ‘physical’ or bodily operations of the same name.17 Comparing, compounding, and 
abstraction are analogous to setting two objects close to one another, joining them by 
some mechanical act or process, or taking away material parts from them. These 
physical manipulations can be performed only insofar as the components are spatially 
related. Some analogous spatial framework must exist for the mental operations to be 
possible. One can imagine how this can work by building a mental particular on a 
spatial grid. The spatiality of the Lockean mind provides the opportunity for 
‘translating’ different kinds of sensory representations into a spatial code and 
comparing, compounding, and abstracting them within it.18   
 
But a spatial code only provides the possibility for similarity and categorization – it is 
not able to explain all of the details.  For example, sensory representations are 
differently spatial. Transferring auditory, visual, or haptic representations is seemingly 
a natural process, i.e. we can judge spatial relations by what we hear (knowing that a 
sound is coming from behind), see, and feel. But gustatory or olfactory representations 
are weak spatial indicators.19 These do not seem to embody a well-ordered spatial code 
in/for humans. Rather than explain away these problems in Lockean account, it will be 
useful to analyze an updated version of Lockean empiricism and ground the discussion 
of sensory categorization in the contemporary debate. 
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Prinz’s Concepts as Proxytypes 
 
Prinz resuscitates a Lockean theory of concepts through contemporary explanatory 
tools of cognitive science. Prinz’s goal is to argue against a language of thought. He 
does this by arguing for what he calls the Modal-Specificity Hypothesis (MSH) - 
‘concepts are couched in representational codes that are specific to our perceptual 
systems’ (FTM, 119). He describes the senses as dedicated input systems and 
establishes that sensory systems are separate neural pathways.20 Prinz understands 
sensory input systems as simply those which receive inputs external to the brain. This 
includes inputs from either ‘the external environment (as with audition, sight, and the 
pheromone system) or from within the body (as with proprioception, interoception, 
hunger, and thirst)’ (FTM, 116). 
Prinz’s notion of dedicated input system means that they ‘[respond] to a proprietary 
input class…[and] that [sense] modalities use different kinds of representations’ (FTM, 
117). This entails that each modality is affected by different physical magnitudes.21 
These different physical magnitudes are represented in distinct codes. Prinz holds that 
these codes are not only used in storage but also during cognition. Because cognition is 
the recall of perceptual representations in an ‘untranslated’ perceptual code, cognition 
does not take place in an amodal code or LOT. 
 
The perceptual primitives in Prinz’s theory are similar to Lockean simple ideas. Objects 
are initially visually recognized as ‘geons,’ or geometric ions. Geons are the 
constituents of visual images. Imagine a human being as being comprised of a group of 
three-dimensional geometric particles. A wide cylinder could constitute the torso; four 
curved cylinders would constitute the arms and legs, and a sphere the head. This ‘low-
level’ recognition of a human being is what Prinz calls an ‘object-model.’ Prinz follows 
Marr’s (1982) idea that such object models can be highly structured. When moving 
closer to the object, what was once a sphere becomes filled with facial features. Getting 
even closer, the facial features become specific, even to the point of contours, hair, 
freckles, etc. This continuum of perceptual representations ‘can be grouped together 
into a hierarchical representation’ (FTM, 142). Even the motion of objects can be 
perceptually represented using similar geons in spatial sequencing. In all, an object 
model provides long-term memory with a visually represented constituent of a concept. 
 
Concepts for Prinz are structured detection mechanisms which can act as proxies 
(proxytypes) for groupings of perceptual representations. They can stand in for those 
groupings during cognition.  Proxytypes for Prinz are not qualitative sensory images 
like Locke’s primitives. They are detection mechanisms which can be shown to reliably 
detect the objects of which those concepts refer. Proxytypes are formed through Prinz’s 
version of Lockean cognitive mechanisms. These are ‘link types.’ A vague sphere-like 
image becomes a person’s face via a hierarchy link. Actions or movements of those 
representations are grouped by a transformation link. Representations given from 
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different sense modalities of one object are grouped by the binding link. 
Representations from the surrounding environment are grouped by the situational link. 
The predicative link groups together old representations of certain objects with new 
representations of those objects. This new grouping allows for the modification and 
updating of the old combination of perceptual representations. Combinations which are 
the results of the linking processes are stored in long term memory but can be activated 
during working memory. It is these combinations of ‘primitive’ perceptual 
representations which act as detection mechanisms that Prinz designates as concepts.   
 
Prinz’s theory is vulnerable to a similar criticism to Locke’s. It has two main problems. 
There is no explanation of how different perceptual representations can be joined 
together to form mental particulars, and the use of geons to represent the visual sense 
modality suggests the use of a spatial code  - for if Prinz’s theory is not qualitative like 
Locke’s (and doesn’t use mental pictures), how are we to understand geons at all? 
 
This is the role of the links to be able to co-instantiate different representations, 
facilitate concept individuation, and produce similarity groupings. But Prinz’s ‘links’ 
only provide the possibility of combining similar perceptual representations. What is 
left open is the rules that govern the grouping processes. Because the links ‘do all the 
representational work,’ Prinz needs to give an explanation of its rules without assuming 
the existence of an amodal code (see Sarnecki, 2004). To answer this question, Prinz 
unfortunately couples his empiricism with a ‘faith in the reality of natural kinds’ (FTM, 
281). But including realism into the model contradicts the mental model he is trying to 
create. The categories and concepts that can possibly be created are determined 
independent of perception.  Thus, the isomorphism spectre is raised.  In short, this 
‘language of ontology’ acts as the amodal code to determine categorization. This makes 
the syntax and semantics of his mental mechanism predetermined – just as they are 
within LOT. 
 
But some of Prinz’s theory’s weaknesses can be ignored by focusing more closely on 
the natures and role of spatiality in cognition, to which I will now turn. I will argue that 
Prinz’s claim that ‘our representation of [an object] is just a collection of interlinked 
images’ is too weak to provide an adequate account of concept categorization (Prinz, 
2004). I will also argue that a spatial code must be posited to influence the 
representational links and provide for a model of categorization. Lakoff’s ‘neo-
empiricist’ or ‘experientialist’ theory of embodiment provides the bases for this 
argumentation. 
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Lakoff’s Theory of Embodiment 
 
Lakoff’s expansive neo-empiricist theory of cognition is based on findings concerning 
prototypes, particulars, and the role of basic level categories. Importantly for my 
purposes, he provides an articulation of an embodied yet adequately internal spatial 
code by which multiple types of representations can be related.   
 
 In Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things (1987), George Lakoff argues that 
categorization is heavily influenced by the kinds of creatures we are. He calls this the 
principle of embodiment. Lakoff proposes that we conceptualize according to a spatial 
code. Our creature-type is based on how we spatially interact with the environment. 
This results in a ‘spatial syntax.’ Humans’ perceptual apparatus is fitted to our shape, 
size, and motor movements and, together, this motor-perceptual matrix has a deep 
influence on the way we categorize our experience. There are two basic ways these 
factors influence our categorization: 1) They allow for perception of basic-level 
categories22 and 2) by providing kinesthetic image schemas. 
 
According to the idea of basic level categorization, the most ‘immediate’ categories, 
those most easily produced and subsequently reproduced in cognition, are at an 
intermediate level of complexity. For example, ‘it is at this level that we distinguish 
tigers from elephants, chairs from tables…etc. One level down in complexity, things 
are much more difficult’ (Lakoff, 269).23 In Lakoff’s terms, our experience is pre-
conceptually structured at the basic level. Yet, for Lakoff, this does not entail that there 
are kinds in the world that match our concepts. The perceptual apparati of our moving 
bodies are tuned to recognize similarities in shape, size, and movement and to 
categorize accordingly. And basic level objects have such higher-order 
identity/individuation conditions.24 We recognize basic-level categories as gestalts, 
perceptual wholes which are more basic for our cognitive lives than their 
decompositional elements.25   
 
Lakoff adds kinesthetic image schemas to the above neo-empiricist ‘foundation’ to 
account for further conceptual structure. The basic idea can be seen through example. 
One of the most basic structures and most frequently used image schema in cognition is 
what he calls the ‘container schema.’ It ‘consist[s] of a boundary distinguishing an 
interior from an exterior’ (Lakoff, 271).26 The model is used in countless conceptual 
representations of objects in the world. For example, I may have woken out of a deep 
sleep, crawled out of bed, gone into the bathroom, rinsed out my mouth, put water into 
a glass that was pouring out of a faucet, etc. All of these are conceptually structured by 
the container schema.   
 
Image schemas also provide structure for cognitive mechanisms, transformations, or 
syntax. This happens through the ‘logic’ of metaphor. For example, before I went to 
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bed I could have worked out or figured out what to write. The container image schema 
is used in conceptualization because we experience our bodies as containers and, thus, 
map that conceptual structure onto other parts of experienced reality. The kinesthetic 
origin of these metaphors is created by the abstraction of a source domain and the 
application of the ‘syntax’ given by the image schema. 
 
The syntax provided by this example’s metaphoric model is straightforward. Concepts 
are combined according to the container schema as being the container or being in or 
out of that container. Certain syntactically based logical rules can be used to 
characterize the syntax. For example, ‘if container A is in container B and X is in A, 
then X is in B – which is the basis for modus ponens’ (Lakoff, 272). Further logical 
rules can be formulated according to the other specific image schemas. 
 
Lakoff’s reason for introducing basic-level categories and image schemas concern the 
semantics of concepts. For him, ‘both basic-level and image-schematic concepts are 
directly meaningful’ (Lakoff, 279). This is because of his empirical ‘foundation’ of 
embodiment which allows for reference. But he resists the idea of a primitive. For 
Lakoff, ‘primitive’ indicates a lack of structure, intrinsical properties of such entities as 
Lockean simple ideas. Basic-level and image-schematic concepts are already highly 
structured, but pre-conceptually or pre-cognitively. Yet once all of Lakoff’s posits are 
in place, the model provides a compositional syntax and a procedure for creating more 
complex concepts from less complex ones.27  
 
Lakoff’s theory is based on an amodal spatial code. This organizes representations 
across disparate sensory media. It also answers how our representational links/cognitive 
mechanisms are created and influenced. We group perceptual representations into 
distinct categories because of pre-conceptual information – our size, shape, perceptual 
apparatus, and motor movements. The spatial code provides a syntax in which, for 
example, we conceptualize our bodies as containers and order concepts according to 
such a spatial code.28 To mix Prinz’s technical terminology with Lakoff’s, here highly-
structured ‘proxytypes’ can be viewed as the ‘primitives’ of the cognitive syntax and 
are understood in relation to other concepts on the basis of certain kinesthetic image 
schemas. 
 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
The empiricist’s classic problem of mental mechanics or syntax, combining sense-
based perceptual representations represented in disparate codes, is alleviated by 
Lakoff’s theory of embodied concepts that feature a spatial code. For example, 
proxytype concepts can be individuated as mental particulars if they represent basic-
level categories. The empirical findings regarding these basic-level categories as well 
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as typicality effects in categorization can be accounted for. The set-theoretical models 
that the computational theory of the mind posits as an explanatory architecture of the 
mind are replaced by an embodiment structure. Because Lakoff’s theory can be seen to 
harbor a spatial code, his model can be used to develop a spatial syntax based in the 
rules of basic-level propositions and decomposition into metaphoric mapping.    
 
One last issue remains to be solved to base neo-empiricism on Lakoff’s system. 
Concept empiricists are against a unique cognitive code. Often they deny an amodal 
code altogether. But what really matters is that the code of cognition is based in the 
senses even if it is just ‘one’ and thus, ‘amodal’ in some sense of the term. In short, 
what matters is that the code coheres with the fundamental externalist empiricist 
intellectual strategy. What about Lakoff’s spatial code? It is clearly dispersed at least 
through its metaphoric extensions across all of cognition. If it is to be judged 
significantly internal, it may even be said to play a role similar to Fodor’s LOT. 
 
It is unclear whether Lakoff’s spatial code should be seen as a deep psychological 
grammar by which categories are created or if it as a spatial structure of reality that 
allows for embodied concepts and a spatial syntax. This can be seen through the role of 
particulars that are essential for both Locke and Prinz. It is unclear whether or not the 
particular is created according to a grammar (as in LOT) or to external sources (as in 
Prinz) for Lakoff. Rather than arguing for a neo-empircist theory of categorization and 
cognition, Lakoff could be seen as providing a formalizable syntax that could be 
assessed as an alternative LOT. To clearly distance concept empiricist from LOT, there 
needs to be an additional emphasis on external sources of similarity. These should be 
based in the role external particulars, objects at Lakoff’s basic level, to produce a full 
alternative to LOT. 
 
Another issue is that spatially coded categorization can only explain so much of our 
cognitive lives. Clearly only some of our categories are spatially determined. Lakoff 
never explicitly denies this fact. The limit of the spatial code is evident at the linguistic 
level of behavior and, maybe, cognition. This is an essential lacking for a theory of 
categorization, including the related syntax and semantics. A large part of our cognitive 
lives is left unexplained unless an account can be given of how a syntax is created for 
non-spatially determined categories as well as how those categories refer to objects in 
the world. I believe that further research regarding the external sources of similarity 
based on external particulars can account for these issues.29 
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Notes 
 
                                               
1
 There are many kinds of empiricists in the domain of semantics broadly speaking.  Concept 
empiricists are a minority in the landscape of 20th century semantic empiricism because they 
actually believe in the existence of concepts/mental representations.  Logical positivists, 
empiricists, and other advocates of an empirically formulated verifiability criterion of meaning 
did not.  Early modern philosophers and all advocates of the idea-idea in turn did.  This paper is 
concerned only with concept empiricism, and so presupposes the existence of mental 
representations. 
 
2
 A code is a set of mental representations (the primitives of cognition) along with combinatorial 
rules and cognitive mechanisms.  
 
3
 Amodalists and mutli-modalists alike recognize that sensory systems may store representations 
in different codes. In Languages of the Mind, Ray Jackendoff (an advocate of amodalism) states 
that ‘information entering the mind comes in many different forms, for example spatial arrays of 
light intensity provided by retinal receptors, temporal patterns of sounds frequencies provided by 
the ears…’ etc (Jackendoff, 3).  Likewise, in Furnishing the Mind, Prinz (the advocate of multi-
modalism under discussion) states that ‘modalities…represent by responding to different kinds of 
magnitudes’ (FTM, 117).   
 
4
 It is worth noting that because thought is couched in a translation of perceptual representations, 
the mechanisms of translation may be said to be the ultimate basis for similarity, for certain 
perceptual representations will be translated to specific and determinate symbols in Mentalese.  
The importance and possible influence of these mechanisms will be fundamental for the 
discussion of concept empiricism below. 
 
5
 For instance, a tiger causes the mental symbol [tiger] just in case a tiger caused [tiger] to be 
occurent in thought. 
 
6
 Productivity is understood as the ability to form an infinite number of discrete thoughts based 
on conceptual primitives.  Systematicity is understood as the ability to understand the thought 
‘John ate the tiger’ if ‘the tiger ate John’ is understood – this results from both thoughts being 
comprised of the same concepts and generated using the same rules.   
 
7
. See Barsalou (1999) 1.2.2 for a brief over-view regarding these findings as well as Prinz 
(2002) ‘Empiricism Reconsidered.’ 
 
8
 See Lakoff (1987) Chapters 11-13.  
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9
 His nominalism is motivated by his familiarity with and proclivity for Boyle’s corpuscular 
hypothesis.  The corpuscular theory claims that the atoms which make up the world are infinitely 
divisible and the objects which are made of those corpuscles are infinitely malleable.  His 
nominalism also precludes the possibility of worldly sources of similarity – there are no 
Aristotelian essences to do categorical work. 
 
10
. This modal-specificity precludes the possibility of a deep psychological grammar such as 
LOT. 
 
11
 A simple idea is one that, ‘being each in it self uncompounded, contains in it nothing but one 
uniform Appearance, or Conception in the mind, and is not distinguishable into different ideas’ 
(E II.ii.I. 18-20).  Examples of simple ideas are ‘Yellow, White, Heat, Cold, Soft, Hard, Bitter, 
Sweet,’ etc (E II.i.3).  Complex ideas are combinations of those simple ideas. 
 
12
 Discernment is necessary because we most often perceive complex ideas – simple ideas in 
combination.  It is ‘a necessary condition of the efficiency of all other operations’ because 
comparing, compounding, and abstracting are mechanisms which (mainly) operate on simple 
ideas (Stewart, 68).  
  
13
 This is why abstraction is often understood as subtraction.  A general idea can be seen as 
certain recognition of a specific idea and the designation of other ideas under that specific idea.  
‘Abstraction for Locke, was a matter not of the idea itself, but a matter in which the 
understanding regards it’ (Waxman, 88).Note that this is different than understanding general 
ideas as novel ideas in which the law of non-contradiction does not apply (taking Locke literally 
when he says that ‘the general idea of a Triangle…must be neither Oblique, nor Rectangle, 
neither Equilateral, Equicrural, nor Scalenon; but all and none of these at once’ (E IV.vii.9).  For 
a similar interpretation of Locke’s account of abstraction, see Dancy (1987). 
 
14
 Identifying groupings based on ‘significant’ resemblance is important, for resemblance is a 
relatively ubiquitous relationship.  Significant resemblances can be ordinary (all red objects) as 
well as complex (types of sub-atomic particles).  
 
15
 A general term such as ‘dog’ refers to all dogs in the same way ‘Fido’ refers to a particular 
dog.  ‘Dog’ refers to the particular idea (the mental particular) which stands in a one-many 
relation to other mental particulars. 
 
16
.Just imagine hypothetically trying to put a flavor in the middle of a written English sentence. 
 
17
 This analogy is stated explicitly at II.xii.1: ‘[the way general ideas are made] shews Man’s 
Power and its way of Operation to be muchwhat the same in the Material and Intellectual World.’   
 
18
 Perhaps this is one additional reason Locke privileged simple ideas of space as ideas of 
primary qualities.  They are not only primary for the ‘Newtonian substance’ but also for the 
mental substance. 
 
19
 That is, they are weak spatial indicators for humans.  Other species may be very adept at 
spatially organizing the world based on scent (e.g. bloodhounds). 
 
20
 Defining the senses as ‘consist[ing] of their own sets of operations and representations housed 
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in separate neural pathways’ rather than in terms of sense organs avoids the objections that two 
sense organs can serve the same sense modality (e.g. interoception) and that the same sense 
organ can serve more than one sense modality (e.g. skin serving both heat and pressure detection; 
and proprioception). 
 
21
. Examples are wavelengths of light [vision], frequency of molecular motion [audition], or 
frequency of molecular shape [smell]. 
 
22
 Basic level categories take the place of atomic information such as the simple ideas of the 
classical empiricists or Prinz’s geons. 
 
23
 Tigers, for example, are at the basic level.  Features such as their color, stripe pattern, or 
texture reside at a lower level of complexity.  Differences in those features determine 
differentiations between ‘subordinate’ categories such as different species of tiger.   
 
24
.Understanding basic-level categories as having higher-order identity avoids the 
misunderstanding that those categories are ultimately created according to perceptual features – 
similarities in shape, size, or movement. 
 
25
 This is important because, as it will be argued, proxytypes may be considered to take the place 
of basic-level concepts in the spatial matrix and spatial syntax. 
 
26
 Lakoff also introduces the PART-WHOLE schema, the LINK schema, the CENTER-
PERIPHERY schema, and the SOURCE-PATH-GOAL schema. 
 
27
 Another important aspect of Lakoff’s psychological syntax is metaphoric mapping.  The mind 
moves from the immediate structures of embodied concepts to others, including abstract (non-
pre-conceptually structured) ones, by natural metaphor.  The metaphor’s source domain, a pre-
conceptual experiential structure, is paired with an abstract domain and a natural metaphor is one 
whose source is pre-conceptually structured through embodied experience.  The example Lakoff 
uses to elucidate the idea concerns the metaphorical mapping of VERTICALITY to 
QUANTITY.  We conceptualize crime rates, stock markets, and sales as falling or rising 
quantitatively because our embodied experience teaches us that an increase in quantity often 
leads to an increase in verticality.  In pre-conceptual experience, when I add sand to a pile or 
water to a glass the level goes up. 
 
28
 These concepts can be expanded metaphorically to account for other uses of spatial 
conceptualizations in new and even to prima facie abstract domains.   
 
29
 One way to address this issue is via Nelson Goodman’s ‘theory’ of symbol systems.  I believe 
that it has the proper resources to address these issues and, in my view, in a manner consistent 
with the spirit off all of the three empiricist theories discussed.  Goodman views categorization 
abstractly, yet relative to symbol systems, regardless of their origin.  He, as all the above 
empiricists, emphasizes the role of the particular for relevant semantic processes and outcomes.  
But unlike Lakoff’s articulation of a spatial code, Goodman is explicit about the externality of 
both the representational systems which create generality and the particulars imbedded in those 
representational systems which are endowed with semantic content. 
 
